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27 May 1969

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14 4 Feb 69

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Program:

Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 1 August - 1 November 1968 [u], 8

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10 C. E. Jordan, Jr.

1. Reference: AR 1-26, 4 November 1966, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program.

2. Transmitted herewith is the debriefing report of Colonel C. E. Jordan, Jr., former Coordinator of Territorial Security and Chief, RF and PF Division OACoFS, CORDS, H<sub>1</sub> MACV.

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## DEBRIEFING REPORT

Country: Vietnam

Debrief Report by: C. E. Jordan, Jr., Colonel, Infantry, 028078

Duty Assignment: Coordinator of Territorial Security and Chief,  
RF and PF Division, OACofS, CORDS, HQ MACV

Inclusive Dates: 1 August - 1 November 1968

Date of Report: 10 November 1968

## FOREWORD

This report addresses the Territorial Force structure of the RVN, their mission and implementation thereof, and the US advisory effort to upgrade their effectiveness. Other areas are treated insofar as they relate to territorial security. Although the report is based upon my observations during my relatively brief tenure with HQ MACV (26 June - date), my experiences as a deputy brigade commander and battalion commander with the 1st Air Cavalry Division in I and II CTZ's during the period 13 Dec 67 - 25 Jun 68 undoubtedly exert an influence.

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Inclosure 1

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1. GENERAL. HQ UDMACV and GVN are placing priority emphasis upon the program to upgrade the effectiveness of Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF). These forces comprise a large proportion of the armed manpower of the RVN, and their success in accomplishing their mission of territorial security may prove decisive in the conduct of the war. RF and PF are basically full-time militia, recruited from and utilized in their native provinces and districts. Lt Gen Ia, the Commanding General of RF and PF, expressed the strong points and weak points of RF and PF as follows:

## Good Points

Good knowledge of their assigned areas  
Knowledge of the local enemy  
Easy to use (don't require much support)

## Bad Points

Not well organized  
Lack of leadership  
Not well trained  
Poorness of POLMAR (political indoctrination)  
Lack of equipment  
Shortcomings of logistics  
Lack of coordination  
Inequality in promotions and decorations  
Poorness of supervision

To Gen Ia's list could be added the "bad points" that RF cannot be deployed outside their home provinces nor PF outside their home districts, except under unusual circumstances. The UDMACV program to upgrade the effectiveness of RF and PF has concentrated upon the above weaknesses, with emphasis upon leadership, training, mission-essential equipment, personnel administration, desertion control, TO&I upgrading, force structure, employment/deployment, and development of doctrine. An example of current interest is the issue of M16 rifles to RF and PF, which should place the units on a firepower par with the local enemy units. Completion of the M16 issue is expected by December 1969. Other aspects of the improvement program will be addressed in this report.

## 2. ORGANIZATION. (All strength data as of 30 Sep 68)

a. Armed Forces of RVN (RVNAF). RVNAF is composed of the Army of RVN (ARVN), the VN Navy (VNN), the VN Air Force (VNAF), the VI Marine Corps (VMC), which comprise the Regular Forces, and RF and PF, which make up the Territorial Forces. With assigned strengths of 216,648 and 171,781 respectively, the RF and PF comprise about 48% of the total strength of RVNAF.

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b. National Organization (TAB A). Under the President and the Ministry of National Defense (MOND), the Joint General Staff (JGS) exercises command and control of RVNAF. The Deputy Chief of JGS is concurrently the CG of RF and PF. The RF and PF Inspection Department, with 11 inspection teams, inspects RF and PF activities in the 44 provinces during each 2-month cycle. US representation in the teams is provided by Inspection Branch of the RF and PF Division, MACCORDS.

c. Territorial Organization (TAB B).

(1) Chain of Command. Command of RF and PF is exercised through the four Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) commanders, Division Tactical Area (DTA) commanders, and the sector commanders. Current directives provide that the DTA commander will be removed from the chain of command as the sectors meet specified organizational criteria and the security situation permits. Throughout much of Vietnam, the DTA commanders, who concurrently command ARVN divisions, continue to exercise varying degrees of control over sector operations. RVN is divided into 44 provinces (states), plus several autonomous cities and special zones. In all 44 provinces, the province chief (political title) is a military officer who is concurrently the sector commander (military title). He exercises command of the territorial force through his deputy sector commander, who has the concurrent title of commander of RF and PF. Regulations provide that if the province chief is a civilian, his deputy will be a military officer who is concurrently sector commander and commander of RF and PF. In all the 246 districts (counties), the district chiefs (political title) are also the subsector commanders (military title). Sector commanders (through deputies) usually exercise command of those RF rifle companies stationed in and around the province capital and delegate control of remaining RF companies to the subsector commanders. Control of PF platoons is normally decentralized. (See par. 2c (4), Operational Control).

(2) Territorial Forces.

(a) Mission. In broadest terms, the mission of territorial forces may be regarded as fourfold:

PROTECT the populace against the enemy.  
DENY to the enemy his sources of manpower, food, and taxes.  
DESTROY the enemy.  
SUPPORT revolutionary development (RD).

(b) Units

1. Currently there are 39 ARVN (regular force) battalions designated in direct support of RD. These battalions are opcon to sector commanders and are utilized for territorial security. CY69 plans call for their replacement by RF units.

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2. There are 12 RF battalions, composed of a BHC and a variable number of rifle companies. No heavy weapons or combat support company is authorized. These battalions are engaged in security of airfields.

3. RF/PF Group Headquarters is a control headquarters capable of exercising opcon of up to 5 RF companies or PF platoon equivalents. It is composed of a CO, a deputy, an operations/intelligence/training section of 2 officers and 3 NCO's, and a support/general services section of 1 officer, 4 NCO's and 7 EM. There are 100 activated of 177 authorized.

4. RF Rifle Company, with 6 officers, 13 NCO's (E5-E9) and 99 EM (E2-E4) is composed of a company headquarters, 3 rifle platoons, and a weapons platoon (2 60mm mortars and 2 cal .30 MG's).

5. RF River Patrol Company is composed of a company headquarters and 2 platoons of 4 LCVP's each. The 24 companies are deployed in delta provinces of III and IV CTZ and are intended primarily for river patrolling and carrying troops and supplies in support of combat operations. In too many cases, they are used almost exclusively in static roles such as bridge defense.

6. RF Mechanized Platoon, with 6 V-100 command cars is authorized on the basis on one to each sector. Actually, there are 51 platoons activated, with some sectors having two or more platoons and some having none. The mechanized platoons are utilized for convoy escort, LOC security, and to form part of sector reaction forces.

7. RF Heavy Weapons Platoon, with 2 81mm mortars and 2 57mm recoilless rifles, are authorized on the basis on one to each sector. There are 44 platoons activated, but many have not received their complement of crew served weapons.

8. RF Intelligence Platoon is also authorized on the basis of at least one per sector. Forty-five platoons have been activated. The platoon is normally used in an intelligence and reconnaissance role.

9. RF Intelligence Squad is authorized on the basis of at least one per subsector. To date, 251 squads have been formed. The squad is also used in an I&R role.

10. PF Platoon, with a platoon leader, assistant platoon leader, and 3 squad leaders, consists of a platoon headquarters and three 10-man rifle squads. In the PF, which does not have an officer or NCO corps, position pay is authorized for platoon leaders, assistant platoon leaders, squad leaders, fire team leaders, radio operators, and medical aidmen. There are 4,781 PF platoons activated of 4,861 authorized.

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### (3) Paramilitary Forces.

(a) Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), numbering 42,497 personnel, are organized, led, and supported by combined VN-US special forces detachments. As areas around CIDG camps become relatively pacified, the CIDG are converted to hF, enabling the special forces to move to other areas.

(b) National police, numbering 67,415, are responsible under the Ministry of Interior for internal law and order in RVN. The National Police Field Forces (NPFF), numbering 12,212, are organized into companies throughout the provinces and are responsible for internal security and law and order primarily in the rural villages and hamlets and for identifying and destroying VC infrastructure (VCI). Members of NP Special Branch normally accompany NPFF with black lists of VCI during cordon and search operations. The program has been plagued by a tendency of NPFF to remain in company strength in province capitals, refusing to deploy into rural areas.

(c) Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), numbering 4,977 personnel, are US-trained units capable of carrying out special missions, usually against VCI.

(d) Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC), numbering 46,631 personnel, are organized into 59-man RD teams (VN) and 70-man Truong Son teams (Montagnard). The teams contain a security element and personnel trained to assist villagers in establishing local government and in carrying out self-help projects. The program is administered by the Ministry of Revolutionary Development (MORD).

(e) Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) are composed of Hoi Chanh. Under the overall direction of the Ministry of Political Warfare, the teams utilize a variety of polwar media to disseminate the GVN message to the people, primarily in contested areas. They accompany RVNAF and FwMAF units during operations into VC-controlled areas. They attempt to induce VCI to come over to the GVN and VC to "Chieu Hoi."

(f) Ki Carson Scouts (KCS), are Hoi Chanh attached to FwMAF units to lend their knowledge of the enemy and his techniques. Like most converts, they have a sense of commitment, are generally not reluctant to accompany US units on combat operations, and can prove invaluable in detecting ambushes, caches, tunnels, and booby traps. Although not trained as interpreters, they soon pick up a few words of English and are often preferred to trained VN interpreters, who sometimes prefer the security of a fire base to getting out on combat operations.

(g) The Popular Self Defense Program, under the Ministry of Interior, has trained 276,575 citizens and armed 62,538 for local defense.

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### (4) Operational Control.

(a) Sector Commander. Subject to directives and restrictions from the CTZ commander and, where applicable, from the DTA commander, the sector commander exercises operational control of territorial and paramilitary forces either directly or through the subordinate headquarters discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. The sector commander also exercises operational control of ARVN battalions designated by corps in DS of RD.

(b) Subsector Commander. Exercises operational control of territorial and paramilitary forces in his subsector.

(c) RF/PF Group Headquarters. Available to sector and sometimes subsector commanders to control RF and PF units. Often used to control units comprising sector reaction force. With sector heavy weapons platoon, mechanized platoon, intelligence platoon, and RF rifle companies, can organize a relatively potent reaction force.

(d) Area Control. Although not common in RVN, instances have been observed where a RF/PF group headquarters or an RF company commander is given responsibility for a RD campaign area or a designated TAOR. The responsible commander exercises operational control of all RF and PF units in the area and sometimes the paramilitary units. Effective results have been attained; however, the concept runs counter to efforts of MORD to place PF platoons under opcon of village governments.

(e) Village Authority. As a means of strengthening village government in rural areas, MORD advocates placing PF platoons under opcon of the elected or appointed village government. The decisive criterion should be whether there exists a viable village government capable of effectively exercising this authority.

### d. Effectiveness/Problem Areas.

(1) Its complexities and obvious weaknesses notwithstanding, the GVN's organization for pacification is a compromise tailored to meet the complexity of the enemy threat and the existing political situation in RVN. The structure is also a compromise between traditional French centralization and US efforts to decentralize authority. There is no simple solution. The basic system can be made to work.

(2) The dual responsibility of the province chief/sector commander poses problems, especially for those incumbents who cannot effectively balance ultimate responsibility with delegation of authority. In addition to military responsibilities, the position calls for supervision of every facet of civil government, including activities monitored by the myriad ministries of GVN. However, the organization does provide the means for delegating authority and reducing the problem of span of control.

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(3) The issue of DTA control of military operations is an elusive one, in that de facto control persists in some areas where GVN authorities claim that DTA control has terminated. The case for DTA control is, of course, the span of control problem of the CTZ commander; e.g., in IV CTZ, where there are 16 sectors. The argument against DTA control is that the DTA headquarters, being primarily a military organization, will fail to consider all aspects of the sector pacification effort in directing the employment of forces. The JGS criterion for termination of DTA control appears valid, in that the security status of the sector should be the determining factor. Effective implementation lies with the CTZ commander. First, he should not permit personal disagreements between DTA and sector commanders to hamper the pacification effort. Second, he should make a clearcut decision regarding the role of the DTA as applies to each sector. Third, the CTZ commander must insure that every available military resource of the DTA, including ARVN, is responsive to the legitimate requirements of sector commanders. Fourth, the CTZ commander must insure that sectors produce effective pacification plans and that DTA commanders are thoroughly acquainted with these plans and coordinate ARVN military operations with sector commanders.

(4) An effective pacification effort requires maximum utilization of every asset. Sector commanders must assign definite responsibilities to subsector commanders and RF/PF group commanders and insure that responsibilities are assigned in turn to every territorial force and paramilitary unit. Commanders must be held strictly accountable for results. The TAOR and pacification campaign area concepts are a means to this end. To make the system work, authority must be decentralized, which many VN commanders are reluctant to do.

### 3. EMPLOYMENT.

a. Missions. Specific pacification missions assigned to RF and PF units as categorized in the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TRES) are as follows:

- (1) Security of hamlets/villages
- (2) Security of district/province towns
- (3) Security of key military installations
- (4) Security of key economic installations
- (5) Security of LOC's
- (6) Reserve and reaction forces

To varying degrees, the effective accomplishment of the above missions calls for offensive operations and aggressive interdiction, particularly at night.

b. Deployment of Forces. The deployment of RF and PF units is dictated in part by the above missions. The attempt to achieve

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more effective employment/deployment of RF and PF is currently a matter of priority concern to HQ MACV. Each corps senior advisor has been requested to submit an employment/deployment/requirements evaluation for his CTZ. MACORDS is preparing an RVN-wide evaluation utilizing analytical techniques and field verification. This latter evaluation is expected to indicate, to district (subsector) level, areas containing surplus units, areas requiring additional units, and areas of probable malemloyment/maldeployment of RF and PF resources. Since more effective employment/deployment of RF and PF resources is greatly needed, RVNAF authorities at every level of command must be aggressively "advised and assisted" in making corrections. Far too many units are still employed in and around province and district capitals in static roles. Not only is this poor defensive strategy, but it restricts the availability of forces to deny rural hamlets and villages to the enemy and hampers the effort to extend pacification. The Accelerated Pacification Campaign for the period 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69 has set goals for the upgrading of more than 1,000 contested hamlets to the "relatively secure" category. Field advisors believe the effort will pay great dividends in terms of more effective employment/deployment of forces. The momentum must not be permitted to subside with termination of the Special Campaign.

### c. Tactics.

(1) Concept of Operation. The role of ARVN and FMAF is to strike enemy main force units and their base areas and to provide a shield against larger enemy units behind which pacification can progress. The role of RF is to destroy local enemy units to company size and to provide a shield for pacification efforts in the villages and hamlets. The PF are to provide external defense for hamlets against guerrillas and smaller enemy units to platoon size. Internal defense of hamlets is the role of NPFF and popular self defense groups. KDC and Truong Son Cadre groups also have armed security elements capable of reinforcing hamlet defense.

(2) A discussion of RF and PF operations cannot be meaningful without an understanding of the role of the "mud fort" heretofore known by RVNAF and US advisors as the outpost. Few if any FMAF and RVNAF units in Vietnam are found at night outside an all-around defensive position, whether it be a hasty perimeter or a more permanent fortified installation. In the case of RF and PF, the outpost usually consists of bunkers connected by berms and/or trenches and surrounded by a variety of barbed wire barriers, buried mines, claymores, and trip flares. Outposts built by units engaged in hamlet/village defense are normally large enough to accommodate the entire unit and, in some cases, the dependents. In far too many cases, the unit remains buttoned up in the outpost at night, allowing the VC to have free run of the hamlet, gathering taxes, recruits, and food and propagandizing and terrorizing the inhabitants. Not only does such an accommodation result in utter failure to accomplish the unit's mission, but it permits the enemy to strike the "defender" at the time and place of his choosing, often with devastating results. On the other hand, US Special Forces advisors working with CIDG, as well as MACV advisors

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whose counterparts have demanded aggressive night interdiction programs, report excellent results and very high kill ratios. The MACV advisory effort to combat the "outpost philosophy" has achieved some results, but much more effort is needed on the part of territorial force commanders and US advisors at every level.

### (3) Combat Operations.

(a) Regional Forces. RF units are capable of executing search and clear, clear and hold, cordon and search and reconnaissance in force operations, either singly, reinforced with sector resources, in conjunction with PF and paramilitary forces, or as joint or combined operations with ARVN or FMAF units. They also serve as reaction forces to reinforce threatened areas and are capable of executing night interdiction around inhabited areas. They can and do participate in airmobile operations, particularly during combined operations with US units. Although RF units are generally familiar with local enemy and terrain, many of their daylight operations result in unproductive "walks in the sun" and their night operations are frequently executed merely to satisfy quotas imposed by higher headquarters. Probably the most productive use of RF units in daylight operations is in executing cordon and search operations, in conjunction with NFFF, against VCI. Execution often leaves much to be desired due to lack of aggressiveness on the part of leaders and their lack of training in command and control of combat operations. To conclude that the RF soldiers lack "cuts" would be an unfair generalization. US field advisors are almost unanimous in singling out leadership as the major deficiency. Aside from the basic effort to improve training and leadership, several techniques to upgrade combat operations show promise. Combined operations with US and other FMAF units not only pay off in terms of utilizing RF knowledge of terrain and enemy, but serve also to improve RF leadership, tactical expertise and confidence. The assignment of TAORs, previously discussed, can pay off, provided results are demanded. Targeting of RF units against known or suspected enemy units in their TAORs is another technique which can produce results if vigorously pursued. The greatest need is training in night operations and vigorous inforcement by commanders of the requirement that every available RF unit execute aggressive night interdiction operations on a continuing basis.

(b) Popular Forces. Except as participants in joint and combined operations, the PF platoon has limited capability to execute offensive operations. The platoon can be effective, however, in patrolling outside its hamlet area during daylight. This daylight patrolling should normally be limited to reconnaissance to discover signs of enemy entry into the hamlet area and to plan the interdiction program for the night.

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Security must be posted during daylight hours, as the enemy will spot laxity and is sure to take advantage of it. Aggressive night interdiction must be SOP for all PF platoons engaged in hamlet/village defense.

### (4) Village and Hamlet Defense.

(a) As discussed above, an aggressive interdiction program around rural hamlets is the real key to the success of the Pacification Program. Remaining in the "mud fort" does not accomplish this mission, nor does the implementation of half-hearted ambushes to meet command-imposed goal. An effective interdiction program calls for a coordinated effort on the part of available ARVN, FVMAF and Territorial Force units. The role of ARVN and FVMAF units is to interdict main force units between enemy base areas and the inhabited villages.

(b) RF units should post ambushes, to include artillery and mortar ambushes, along likely enemy routes from base areas and patrol along LOCs and between inhabited areas. The artillery ambush is a relatively effective economy-of-force measure consisting of a trip flare around which artillery or mortar fires have been registered.

(c) RF units should interdict enemy routes around the periphery of the hamlets. Considering the relatively few personnel available in the average situation, the interdiction program must use every trick of the trade to economize on personnel and to insure that every likely route is covered. One or two squad ambushes can be placed along the more likely routes where a reasonable degree of certainty exists that the VC will enter. However, better coverage can be achieved by employing smaller fire team ambushes, two or three-man sniper teams and the use of booby traps, trip flares, mortar or artillery ambushes and any other "trick or treat" device which the ingenuity of the platoon can contrive. It should be SOP that each man emplaces two or three of these devices to cover likely routes to the front and flanks of the team's position. Obviously, such a system calls for the interdiction teams to remain in place throughout the hours of darkness. This contradicts those who advocate "aggressive" patrolling around the hamlet area. Experience indicates, however, that a good interdiction program as described above will achieve effective results just as the most successful deer hunter is he whose chooses a good blind and awaits his prey. Ambushes and team sites must be varied nightly to avoid setting a pattern and to adjust the sites to the routes that the VC are actually using. Patrolling should take place along LOCs and between hamlet/village complexes, normally by RF.

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(d) To be successful, the interdiction program calls for maximum effort at night, with the daytime reserved for rest, family relationships, training and preparation for the nightly activities. This preparation should consist of a daylight reconnaissance around the periphery of the hamlet to determine VC attempts to bypass the positions of the previous night and to select positions for the coming night. Teams should move out just before dusk and occupy alternate positions in the vicinity of the previously selected sites. Taking advantage of early dusk, the teams should move covertly to their selected sites. No inhabitant of the hamlet, regardless of his reputation for loyalty, should be permitted to know the location of these positions. Curfew must be strictly enforced. Leaders must strictly enforce noise and light discipline. This is extremely important, in view of current tendencies of RF and PF units to fire a shot or two upon taking up their night positions. There is little doubt that these shots are fired to indicate positions to the VC in the hope that he will not use the route covered by the ambush.

(e) Such an interdiction program, if vigorously pursued, will result in effective accomplishment of the platoon's mission. Any VC parties attempting to enter the hamlet will either enter the killing zone of the ambush, be fired upon by snipers, set off a booby trap, or trip a flare. The VC will react as would any other human being--he will hit the dirt, pull back, retire from the area, or attempt to probe the position. If he attempts the latter, he will encounter other "trick or treat" devices and sniper fire from the flanks or rear. Frequently he will be destroyed or demoralized. At the very least, he will be delayed. This system will not prevent major attacks by large VC units, nor is it intended to.

(f) The most important obstacle to the implementation of a good interdiction program is human psychology. Even the best trained US units, when called upon to interdict enemy elements at night, need to be shown that the ambush element has the upper hand through the advantages of surprise, previously selected positions and prepared fires. The soldier on night ambush duty feels very alone and is reluctant to "trigger" the ambush, even when the enemy has entered the prepared killing zone. When he is properly trained, strongly led, and attains that confidence which only comes from having participated in a successful ambush, he will be willing to continue. Additionally, RF and PF soldiers must be indoctrinated through the FOIWAR program in order that their responsibility for protecting the people will be ingrained. That is, they must become

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people-oriented, rather than self-oriented and unit-oriented, as at present.

### (5). Combat Support.

(a) Most RF and PF units are located within artillery fans of ARVN, US or other FVNAF units. To supplement these artillery fires, some sectors utilize 4.2 mortars authorized under Tables of Allowances and manned by RF crews. One of the major problems with respect to indirect fire support is the chronic shortage of mortar illumination rounds. Experience has indicated that US artillery units provide almost immediate artillery fire support, but ARVN artillery support usually entails a delay of some 15 to 30 minutes.

(b) Air support is normally provided by USAF and Army aviation units in the form of close TAC air support, "Spooky" and gunships. Many US advisors advocate an increase in VNAF close air support units for two reasons: VNAF FAC's can communicate with the support units even when US advisors are not present on the ground; additionally, VNAF is in a better position to take responsibility for ascertaining the rules of engagement which should be followed in each situation, especially when support is rendered in or near inhabited areas. USAF FAC's are normally available to province advisory teams and render effective support not only in bringing in TAC air, but also in flying daily surveillance missions throughout the province. There is a crying need to integrate VNAF FAC's into these activities. With the presence of from one to three US FAC's in each province, very little resources would be required to afford US advice, assistance and practical training to VNAF FAC's. In one province visited by the writer, the USAF officers indicated that a VNAF FAC was available, but most of his time was spent flying college girls around the countryside. If allowed to continue, this situation will result in our missing a bet not only to increase the effectiveness of combat support for RF and PF, but to leave our Vietnamese counterparts with an invaluable capability if and when our forces depart from RVN.

(c) Although more properly in the field of combat service support, MEDEVAC often poses a problem for RF and PF units and advisors. USA MEDEVAC choppers are normally responsive to MEDEVAC requests, but usually refuse to go in at night unless there is a US advisor on the ground.

### d. Intelligence.

(4) Organization. Each sector and subsector headquarters has a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) which serves to house the S2 - S3

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activities. In addition, as a result of the Phoenix - Phung Hoang Program to destroy the VCI, sectors and subsectors throughout RVN are constructing PIOCCs (Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers) and DIOCCs (District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers). There are high expectations that these centers, which will serve as a depository of VCI intelligence and coordinate the follow-up operations, will be effective in eliminating the VCI. One question, however, why the buildings now under construction are separate and apart from the TOCs.

(2) Agencies. As mentioned previously, each sector has an RF intelligence platoon and each subsector has an PF intelligence squad. These units are available for intelligence and reconnaissance missions and for utilization in the counterintelligence program. The more technical intelligence work is performed by Military Security Service units. RF and PF rifle units can be effective intelligence agencies through the use of long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRPs), observation posts and listening posts. Also available to the sector and subsector headquarters are paid intelligence agents, PHU, KP, NFFF, RUC teams, Popular self-defense groups and FACs. Maximum utilization should be made of intelligence produced by ARVN and FVMAF intelligence agencies.

(3) Sources. Depending upon the rapport established with the people, they can be a most fruitful source of intelligence. PWs are an excellent source and it is unusual VC who does not tell all after his capture. Probably the most effective source of intelligence is the Hoi Chanh, who will not only tell all, but who will normally lead friendly elements to enemy base areas, weapons and rice caches and other hiding places.

(4) Dissemination and Use. Obviously, the reporting of information to higher and lower headquarters and to adjacent units should be SOP. However, much improvement is needed in this regard. Speed is of the essence. Even in US units, information on VC locations and movement is normally received too late to be of any value. It is important to get information to the level of command capable of effective follow-up. For example, a subsector headquarters receiving information concerning main force activities should not only report that information immediately to CTZ but should transmit it simultaneously to the nearest FVMAF or ARVN headquarters in the locality. On the other hand, FVMAF and ARVN units should transmit information concerning VCI or guerrilla activities to the appropriate sector or subsector headquarters. If follow-up on intelligence is to be effective, it must be immediate. As previously mentioned, an effective technique is the targeting of RF units against known or suspected VC units within their TAORs.

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(5) Counterintelligence. Counterintelligence in the territorial force system needs improvement. The best measures are the simplest, such as varying ambush sites nightly, occupying positions under cover of dusk or darkness, and enforcing strict noise and light discipline. Future operations should not be announced to leaders until the afternoon before the operation. Higher headquarters should keep to a minimum their requirement for subordinate headquarters to submit plans in advance. Rather than detailed plans, these requirements should call for operational forecasts for the purpose of allocating resources and coordinating major efforts.

### e. Problems/Weaknesses.

(1) The basic problem affecting Territorial Forces operations is a lack of aggressive, effective leadership. This problem results in part from overcentralization of authority and failure of commanders to hold intermediate and junior leaders accountable for their actions or failure to act. The problem is also due to a numerical lack of trained leaders which is aggravated by combat losses among the officer and NCO corps.

(2) The concentration of Territorial Force units around provincial and district capitals and the assignment of large numbers of these units to static defense of installations seriously affects the pacification effort.

(3) The deployment of Territorial Force units is restricted by the fact that RF units can not be deployed outside their home provinces, nor PF units outside their home districts.

(4) The ability of sector commanders to employ their Territorial Force units effectively is affected by restrictions imposed by higher headquarters. In this regard, areas of operation of ARVN and RVNAF units comprise a high proportion of territory in many provinces, which severely restricts the employment of RF and PF units.

(5) In many instances, there is a lack of coordination between sector and subsector headquarters and nearby ARVN and RVNAF units. The solution lies in coordinated pacification planning in which all resources must be integrated for the purpose of accomplishing the common mission.

(6) RF and PF units in many areas do not enjoy firepower comparable to that of the enemy. The issue of the M16 Rifle should do much to remedy this deficiency. In order to achieve victory, RF and PF

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leaders and soldiers must be imbued with the will to win. They must must achieve a sense of mission which can only come from becoming oriented toward the necessity for protecting the people and for destroying the enemy.

### 4. TRAINING.

a. Organization (T-4 F). RVNAF training is under the supervision of the Central Training Command (CTC). CTC supervises the many service colleges, branch and technical schools, the Military Academy and NCO Academy, and RF and PF training centers. Until recently, PF training centers were under the control of the CTMs. Under a recent consolidation plan, 12 inter-provincial PF training centers were established throughout RVN under direct supervision of CTC. These centers will have increased capacity and will be responsible for training of individual PF replacements, basic unit training of new PF platoons and refresher training of old PF platoons. Long-range plans call for eventual consolidation into five PF training centers. The seven highland (Montagnard) PF training centers in the Central Highlands will remain at a 100-man capacity under II Corps control. The consolidation of PF training centers offers advantages in terms of standardization of training as well as improvement of facilities. However, close coordination has been found to be necessary between the training centers and the CTZ's and provinces from which the trainee units originate.

b. Political indoctrination. To supplement the training received in RF and PF Training Centers, training is given on-site by Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) in revolutionary development for both RF and PF units. Additionally, the PF receives the Motivation and Indoctrination Program, which is a program administered by MTTs consisting of 120 hours of initial training and a 72-hour refresher course. Since the training received in training centers at present includes revolutionary development and political indoctrination, there appears to be a need for standardizing the several curricula and utilizing the resources to greater advantage. As it is, the program is so complex that no one at any level appears to understand it. An effective indoctrination program for both RF and PF personnel is of utmost importance. The program should imbue leaders and soldiers alike with a sense of nationhood, dedication to the mission of protecting the people, the importance of rapport with the people, the purpose of the RD Program and brief, rudimentary training in how to help the people to initiate self-help projects.

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c. PWMAF Support. Training is also supplemented by courses of instruction administered by US and other PWMAF units. For example, US units have furnished leadership training to RF and PF leaders. The ROK Capital Division has trained more than 160 PF platoons in a very effective one week course which concentrates upon combat operations. Training has also been furthered through the work of MACV Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT's), which will be discussed in more detail in Paragraph 7.

d. In-Place Training. JCS has published a simple 6-hour weekly training program consisting of marksmanship, indoctrination and basic tactical training, to be conducted by unit leaders. Reports indicate that only a small percentage of units meet the 6-hour weekly goal.

### e. Problems.

(1) RF and PF training centers provide little, if any, practical training in night operations. Effective night training for night interdiction work under realistic conditions should be the single most important item in the tactical program of instruction.

(2) Priority emphasis should also be given to political/military indoctrination programs for the purpose of imbuing in every RF and PF leader a sense of mission, hatred for the enemy, and impressing upon him the importance of being a loyal defender of the people.

(3) Leadership training, particularly in the RF, has been hampered by a failure to take advantage of quotas. Province officers, who are given the excuse that leaders are needed too badly in the units and that if they are sent off to training they will not return. HQ MACV has attempted to convince JCS that mandatory quotas are needed and that some guarantee should be given to sector commanders that trainees will be returned to their units.

(4) Training centers have encountered problems involving RF and PF units arriving at training centers without sufficient cadre to assist in supervising the conduct of training. Also, PF platoons after arriving at training centers for basic unit training or refresher training are discovered to be composite platoons from several units. Apparently, both leaders and soldiers look upon the training center period as an opportunity to take leave. Desertions by trainees after arrival at the training center constitutes an additional problem. These problems can be solved only by the exercise of strong leadership on the part of sector and sub-sector commanders. Training centers have been asked to bring these problems to the immediate attention of the responsible commanders.

(5) Command emphasis is needed to insure that units conduct sufficient in-place training.

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## 5. LOGISTICS.

### a. Organization (TAB B).

(1) RVNAF logistics is supervised by the Central Logistics Command (CLC) in Saigon. Each CTZ has one Area Logistics Command (ALC), with the exception of II CTZ, which has two ALC's. The ALC provides technical service depots and maintenance support within its area. MACV provides advisory teams to CLC and the ALC's, as well as Mobile Advisory Log Teams (MAITs) to assist in the area logistics effort.

(2) At sector level, the Administration and Direct Support Logistical Company (A&DSL Co) is an RF resource, providing personnel administration, finance, supply, maintenance, graves registration and services support to territorial forces within the sector. The US advisory team to the A&DSL Company has recently been augmented to nine officers and men as a part of the RF and RF Improvement Program.

### b. Effectiveness.

(1) One has only to visit the average A&DSL Company to realize that real progress has been made in the logistics effort. Although command supervision can be improved and some corruption still exists, the supply and maintenance systems are being made to work.

(2) The weakest links in the supply system are the supply sergeant in the RF company and the subsector S4 section, which is normally responsible for supplying the RF platoons. Some A&DSL companies have attempted to solve this problem by requiring RF company supply sergeants to work in and under the direct supervision of the A&DSL company commander. In some other cases, the supply sergeants and RF platoon supply representatives work under the direct supervision of the subsector S4. These control measures offer some protection against the tendency of lower echelon supply personnel to dispose of supplies in the local Black Market.

(3) The supply system is also hampered by the reluctance of unit commanders to press their superiors to remedy critical shortages. Apparently, they believe that once a superior has had a problem brought to his attention it would be in poor taste to mention it again. However, advisors who have taken the trouble to check requisitions often find that unit commanders have never submitted written requisitions.

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(4) Transportation for the movement of supplies is always a problem. Generally, for sectors located within 60 kilometers from the ALC, supply point distribution is used. This places a burden on A&DSL companies which, in many cases, have little more than a half of their authorized trucks. The condition of LOC's also aggravates this problem. In some areas of Vietnam, convoys may move only with armed escort. For many outlying areas, air transportation must be used to move supplies.

(5) Although sufficient PRC-25 radios have been issued to fulfill 98% of RF and PF unit requirements, the radios on hand are old and many are beyond economical repair. Sufficient LOC-10 radios were issued to form maintenance floats in each A&DSL Company; however, the difficulty of maintaining old radios often results in maintenance backlogs, making direct exchange impossible. As more PRC-25 radios become available for issue to RF and PF units, this problem will be alleviated.

(6) ARVN authorities, faced with administrative and logistical problems of every type, must concentrate upon the essentials; i.e., mission essential equipment and those supplies and services which most directly effect the morale and fighting efficiency of the units.

## 6. PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION.

a. As mentioned above, the A&DSL company is responsible for personnel administration and payment of RF and PF troops. One of the current efforts is to establish by-name accounting of PF soldiers who were previously accounted for only numerically. The personnel accounting problem has been a problem, particularly with respect to payment of allowances and payments of dependent rice allowances. To assist in solving these problems, pay data cards have been instituted and each soldier is informed of his entitlements.

### b. Problems.

(1) Desertions: RF and PF desertion rates, while averaging lower than that of ARVN, constitute a serious problem. Contributing factors include lack of leadership, corruption on the part of leaders, deployment of units outside their immediate home areas and low living standards in the form of pay and housing. Measures to control desertions as part of the RF and PF Improvement Program include a program to

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fingerprint all RF and PF personnel, posting the names of deserters in their home communities, improved ID cards, POLWAR indoctrination, improvement of living standards and stringent punishment of deserters. A case in point is rice allowances. The PF soldier is authorized to receive 200 piasters per month for each of his certified dependents. Particularly in the highland areas, soldiers cannot provide legally documented birth and marriage certificates. Since the average soldier cannot pay the 400 piasters for obtaining certification for each of his dependents, procedures have been instituted whereby he can be exempted from the fee requirements. However, this exemption must be approved in Saigon or in Hue, which requires many weeks or months to process. It is essential that red tape be eliminated where it affects the morale of the soldier and his ability to support his dependents.

(2) Leadership. As heretofore mentioned, lack of effective leadership is the single most important deterrent in the effort to improve territorial security. Among the causes of inferior leadership are the lack of opportunities for RF soldiers to enter OCS and the NCO Academy, failure to fill available quotas in leadership courses, a relatively weak code of military justice and failure to enforce its provisions, low pay for leaders, failure to recognize leadership in a form of promotions and other rewards and religious and social discrimination. The RF and PF Improvement Program is addressing these causes of poor leadership. Efforts are being made to insure that PF leaders are appointed and receive their position pay. US advisors have received instructions to assist in the identification, training, and promotion of effective leaders and in the identification and removal of incompetents. As previously mentioned, RVNAF authorities have been requested to enforce mandatory fulfillment of leadership training quotas. Also, US advisors have been encouraged to recommend outstanding leaders for US decorations and to encourage their ARVN counterparts to recognize these leaders with appropriate awards and decorations. Utilizing analytical techniques, MACCORDS has produced and is field-verifying a leadership model in which lists of outstanding and unsatisfactory units are compiled from leadership indicators in the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES), which is described in para 7 below. If field verification proves the model to be valid, these lists will be furnished to JGS and MACV field advisors for appropriate follow-up action.

## 7. PACIFICATION MANAGEMENT.

### a. US Advisory Organization.

(1) HQ MACV (TAB C). Within the MACV Command Group, IEP COMUSMACV For CORDS is charged with responsibility for the pacification

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advisory effort. The Assistant DEPCOMUSMACV For COORDS has territorial forces as his primary area of interest. Additionally, DEPCOMUSMACV (Gen Abrams, then Gen Goodpaster) has displayed an active and continuing interest in the program to upgrade the effectiveness of RF and PF. As a result of this active command interest, the entire MACV Staff has increasingly accepted responsibility for RF and PF matters within their respective areas of interest. Within the OACofS for COORDS, the RF and PF Division is the focal point for RF and PF matters, serves as the principal liaison agency with JCS and other MACV agencies, has primary MACV Staff interest in the upgrading and utilization of RF and PF, furnishes the US element on combined MACV/JCS RF and PF inspection teams and keeps field advisors informed through periodic RF and PF conferences at HQ USMACV, the monthly RF and PF Newsletter and field liaison visits. The Plans and Programs Division integrates territorial forces resources into pacification planning. The Operations and Analysis Division manages the Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) and the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) and is responsible for field reporting on pacification. Under the Coordinator of Civil Operations, the several "technical" divisions of MACCORDS advise and assist their counterpart GVN ministries in implementing the revolutionary development, public safety, Psyops, Chieu Hoi and refugee programs. Administrative support is provided by Management Support Division. The Evaluations Branch makes field evaluations of problem areas and reports directly to ACofS, COORDS. With the exception of RF and PF Division and OAD, which have military chiefs, COORDS divisions are headed by foreign service officers.

(2) Field Advisory Organization. The COORDS organization in each of the major subordinate commands (III MAF, IFFV, IIFFV and IV Corps Advisory Group) is essentially the same as in HQ MACV (TAB D). The two advisory channels should be noted. The COORDS advisory channel, which actually begins with DEPCOMUSMACV For COORDS, extends through the Region/CTZ Dep COORDS and the Province Senior Advisor (PSA) to the District Senior Advisor (DSA). The channel of US advisors with ARVN units extends from the CTZ Deputy Senior Advisor through the Division Senior Advisor to the Regimental and Battalion Advisors. The Force Commander is Senior Advisor to the CTZ Commander. Province and District advisory teams are relatively flexible organizations composed of military and civilian advisors and tailored to the security and political needs of the particular area. If the PSA is a civilian, his deputy will be military and vice versa. US Army Special Forces detachments serve as the basis for advisory teams in several provinces and districts. An example of a province advisory team organization is shown at TAB E. Normally the RF and PF Advisor, a major, reports directly to the PSA or Deputy PSA.

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(whoever is the senior military advisor), is not bound to S2/S3 operational duties and is free to work with the Deputy Sector Commander (CO of RF and PF), the A&DSL company and its advisory team, the district advisory teams, MAT's and RF and PF units. This appears to be the most effective arrangement; however, all territorial advisors should consider RF and PF "their business".

## (3) Mobile Advisory Teams (MATs).

(a) Organization and Employment. The RF and PF Improvement Program calls for 353 MAT's to be deployed by 31 December 1968. These are 5-man US Teams trained at the USARV Advisor School and deployed to provinces for the purpose of upgrading RF and PF units by directly advising and assisting unit leaders. Each team consists of 2 officers (leader and assistant) and 3 EM (light weapons infantryman, heavy weapons infantryman and medic). Ideally, the team lives with the RF or PF unit, assists in its training and accompanies it on operations. Emphasis must be placed on command and control; the conduct of combat operations, particularly at night; marksmanship; use of booby traps; and the planning and control of supporting fires. Having assisted unit leaders to bring the unit to optimum effectiveness, the MAT moves on to another unit, but visits the previous unit periodically to check its progress and render assistance as necessary to prevent regression. Some MAT's work simultaneously with an RF company and several PF platoons in the vicinity. The MAT is capable of splitting into two elements to accomplish its mission.

(b) Effectiveness: The more than 250 MAT's which have been deployed have proven their potential. Some of the problems encountered are as follows:

1. In many provinces, MAT's live in district team compounds rather than with RF and PF units. Although security considerations are offered as the basis for this tendency, the IV CTZ Senior Advisor requires that MAT's live with the units they advise. The IV CTZ policy insures more effective utilization and safeguards against the tendency of some DSA's to employ MAT members to reinforce their advisory teams.

2. Some MAT's have devoted several weeks to improving mud forts, thereby failing to upgrade unit effectiveness in minimum time and also reinforcing the RF and PF in their adherence to the "outpost philosophy". Where an operating base does not offer sufficient security, the PSA and DSA and their counterparts should give priority

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support to the MAT and the unit advised in order that the work is completed in minimal time and the MAT can concentrate upon higher priority goals.

3. MAT personnel must guard against the tendency to "take over" a unit. If the MAT does everything for a unit, from rectifying equipment shortages to controlling its training and operations, regression will be sure and swift when the MAT departs.

4. HQ MACV is taking action to rectify problems that MAT's have encountered in obtaining qualified personnel and in the logistical support area.

5. In summary, MAT's can be an effective resource in upgrading the combat effectiveness of RF and PF units. By working with and through unit leaders and by concentrating on essentials, the MAT's in being and programmed should succeed in significantly improving every currently deployed RF and PF unit by mid-CY 1969.

b. TFES/HES. The Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) and the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) are computerized systems based upon monthly data reported by DSA's. The summaries of data resulting from these reports are utilized by HQ MACV in the preparation of recommendations to JCS and other GVN agencies regarding the pacification effort.

(1) TFES provides a monthly updating on RF and PF units including such information as unit designation, location by village and hamlet names and UTM coordinates, primary and secondary missions, unit personnel strengths by category, training status, on-hand mission-essential equipment, evaluation of unit performance, problem areas, and performance statistics. In addition to the monthly summaries, the TFES data base can produce special analyses and thereby minimize the need for field reporting.

(2) HES provides a monthly report of the pacification status of each hamlet in RVN, based upon evaluations by DSA's utilizing a series of indicators which fall broadly into two categories: security and development. Based upon the security evaluations, hamlets are given security ratings from A (most secure) to E (least secure), plus a "VC controlled" category. More broadly, the hamlets are categorized as "relatively secure" (A, B, C), "contested" (D, E), and "VC controlled". The system is capable of producing map printouts on which hamlets are categorized in color.

(3) The extraction of selected information from the TFES and HES data banks can produce correlations of great value to the pacification

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effort. An example of the utilization of the TFES-IES "interface" is the analytical study of employment and deployment of RF and PF units referred to in Para 3b, above. The progress of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign will be measured by utilizing the two systems.

c. National Priority Areas. Based upon population density, economic importance, lines of communication and presence of important governmental installations, national priority areas have been established to assist in the planning and direction of the pacification effort and in the allocation of resources. The concept is useful, provided that it is applied with full knowledge of its limitations and in conjunction with other available information pertinent to the purpose. For example, the concentration of territorial force units in a priority area which already enjoys a relatively high degree of security (from IES) and is not likely to be seriously threatened by enemy forces (from intelligence estimates), would constitute mal-deployment of forces. The current MACV employment/deployment study and the similar studies being performed in each CTZ should spot areas of mal-deployment.

d. Goals. Quantifiable goals are applied to most projects in the RF and PF Improvement Program, usually in terms of a numerical goal to be achieved by a given date; e.g., rifle companies to be activated by end CY68. The current Pacification Campaign calls for a given number of contested hamlets (H&S category) to be raised to "relatively secure" by a given date. Another goal might consist of having a prescribed percentage of PF platoons engaged in village/hamlet defense (as measured by TFES) by end of 1st Quarter CY69. Goals such as these are meaningful, provided the manager remains alert to their fallacies, such as the subjective judgments upon which the attainment of the goals are measured in the preceding two examples. Goals are applied by JCS in attempts to insure that RF and PF units are operating effectively. For example, each RF and PF unit is required to execute a prescribed number of operations weekly, a given number to be "run" at night. This has resulted in many thousands of weekly operations, but with little, if any, increase in contacts, enemy killed, or weapons captured. Having determined that many units conduct meaningless "walks in the sun" or put out night ambushes for an hour or two just to achieve the weekly quota, HQ MACV has recommended a revision in the definition of an "operation" and is emphasizing the necessity for effective operations, particularly at night. No management goal can substitute for continued and effective command supervision.

e. Implementation. Confronted with the pacification problem in Vietnam, the immediate reaction is to begin thinking of new approaches,

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new ideas. A check through the records will usually reveal that the "new" idea, if a good one, is already "on the books", waiting in the form of directives and guidance to the field. What is needed is continued and forceful follow-up by every level of command on those projects which are essential to the pacification effort.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS.

- a. That the territorial forces concept be continued and that Hq. USMACV oppose the reorganization of RF into battalions.
- b. That the position of province chief be "civilianized" as the security situation permits, with the deputy assuming more of the purely military duties.
- c. That CTZ commanders abide by the directive mandating total control of sectors and make clearcut decisions in each case.
- d. That territorial force units be assigned specific missions, utilizing TAOR's wherever applicable, and that commanders be held strictly accountable for results.
- e. That pacification planning at CTZ and province level incorporate every available military resource and that ARVN and VNAF units be required to coordinate operations with sector commanders and respond to sector requirements for military support.
- f. That commanders and advisors at every level stress the effective deployment and employment of territorial forces.
- g. That immediate steps be taken to insure effective training in night operations at RF and PF training centers.
- h. That the MIP and RD training programs be simplified and command emphasis placed on improving political indoctrination and sense of mission.
- i. That 7th Air Force initiate a program to utilize sector FAC's to train VNAF counterparts.
- j. That emphasis continue on the upgrading of RF and PF leadership as a matter of highest priority.
- k. That CTZ and province advisors stress the proper employment of MAT's.
- l. That MACV inspectors check the utilization of all territorial force units--ARVN battalions in DS of RD, RF river patrol



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companies, intelligence platoons, mechanized platoons, etc.--as well as RF and PF rifle units.

m. That MACV inspectors and advisors, when visiting a unit, make a point of entering the nearby hamlet and discussing security with the hamlet authorities and RDC group members.

n. That the MACV inspection and advisory effort assist RVNAF to implement programs in being, concentrating on essentials, before attempting to provide new programs.




C. E. JORDAN, JR.  
Colonel, USA  
Chief, RF & PF Div

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
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TAB A



CURRENT ORGANIZATION



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TAB C

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**CIA**

Price                      Assoc. Gen'l. Of. Grinn.

           X-X-X-X           

Assoc. Sec'y                      for                      X-X-X-X

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
- Operational Control when unit assigned on RD  
here, support mission.

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## INTERNETED PROVINCE ADVISED BY

_____	Control and
_____	CPCO.
_____	Coordination
_____	Civilian
_____	Military

**NOTE:** The diagram illustrates only one way to organize an integrated team. Actual organization will vary from province to province.



E  
 TAB

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